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 1 
Summary 
Non-refoulement is a fundamental principle of international law, providing 
an individual the protection from being returned to a place where he or she 
risks persecution, torture or other ill treatment. The prohibition on 
refoulement is recognized in refugee law, human rights law and 
international customary law. Some would argue that the rule has even 
attained status as a peremptory norm. While there are exceptions to the right 
to non-refoulement in the1951 Refugee Convention, human rights law 
dictate that non-refoulement to face torture or ill treatment is an absolute and 
non-derogable right. In light of the modern threat of global terrorism, many 
states are applying a “balancing act” between the interest of the refugee and 
national security concerns.  However, there is no international consensus on 
the permissibility of a balancing act weighing the interest of the refugee 
against the security interest of a state. While the UNHCR permits such an 
approach through the exceptions to non-refoulement in Article 33(2), it has 
been rejected by the HRC, the ECtHR and the ICCPR. There is a 
problematic collision between legal and political interests, as states keep 
challenging the absolute nature of non-refoulement to face torture or ill 
treatment in the name of counter-terrorism. 
 
 
 2 
Sammanfattning 
Non-refoulement är en grundläggande princip inom internationell 
flyktingrätt och mänskliga rättigheter. Non-refoulement innebär rätten för en 
individ att inte bli återsänd till en plats där han eller hon riskerar förföljelse, 
tortyr eller annan omänsklig eller förnedrande behandling. Förbudet mot 
refoulement är erkänt i flyktingrätt, mänskliga rättigheter och i internationell 
sedvanerätt. Somliga skulle argumentera att principen dessutom uppnått 
status som en jus cogens regel. 1951 års Flyktingkonvention medger att det 
finns undantag till principen, men internationella konventioner för 
mänskliga rättigheter dikterar att principen är absolut och att inga undantag 
kan göras. I ljuset av dagens globala terrorhot använder flera stater sig av en 
balansmetod för att väga flyktingens intresse mot statens säkerhetsintresse. 
Det finns dock ingen internationell konsensus om huruvida en sådan 
balansmetod är legal. UNHCR föreslår att stater använder sig av en 
proportionalitetsbedömning när de applicerar undantaget Artikel 33(2) men 
en såväl HRC, Europadomstolen och ICCPR har konstaterat att en sådan 
balansmetod bryter mot rättighetens absoluta natur. Stater fortsätter att 
utmana den absoluta statusen för non-refoulement för att bekämpa terrorism 
vilket skapar därför en problematisk kollision mellan legala och juridiska 
intressen. 
 3 
Preface 
For the men, women and children fleeing persecution, war and injustice.  
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Abbreviations 
 
ACHR  American Convention on Human Rights 
ACHPR  African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
CAT  Convention Against Torture,  
ECHR  European Convention of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
ECtHR  European Court of Human Rights 
HRC  United Nations Human Rights Committee 
ICCPR  International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UDHR  Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UN  United Nations 
UNSC  United Nations Security Council 
UNSCR  United Nations Security Council Resolution  
VCLT  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
"We have reached a moment of truth/…/ World stability is falling apart leaving a wake of 
displacement on an unprecedented scale. Global powers have become either passive 
observers or distant players in the conflicts driving so many innocent civilians from their 
homes/…/Fifteen years into a millennium that many of us hoped would see an end to war, a 
spreading global violence has come to threaten the very foundations of our international 
system/…/Borders are closing, pushbacks are increasing, and hostility is rising. Avenues 
for legitimate escape are fading away/…/Today, some of the wealthiest among us are 
challenging this ancient principle [the protection of refugees], casting refugees as gate 
crashers, job seekers or terrorists. This is a dangerous course of action, short-sighted, 
morally wrong, and – in some cases – in breach of international obligations.”1 
Antonio Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
At time of writing, there are almost 60 million forcibly displaced persons in 
the world, according to the UNHCR.2 Nearly 20 million, of which half are 
children, fulfill the requirements for refugee status. 86 percent of the 
world’s refugees are currently hosted by less wealthy countries.3 The 
UNHCR has called it a global crisis and called upon wealthier states to 
share the burden. 
 
While the number of persons fleeing persecution and war continues to rise, 
many refugee-receiving states are becoming increasingly concerned with 
closing their borders. Following the attacks on the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon on September 11 2001, and the bombings and attacks on Bali, 
in Madrid and London 2002, 2004 and 2005, terrorism and external threats 
to the national security of states has become a significantly increasing 
concern.4 Combatting terrorism has been at the top of the international 
agenda, and multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions have 
                                                
1 http://www.unhcr.org/55842cb46.html last accessed 2015-07-28. 
2 http://www.unhcr.org/55842cb46.html last accessed 2015-06-21.  
3 http://www.unhcr.org/55842cb46.html last accessed 2015-06-21. 
4 Bruin and Wouters, 2003, pp. 5-6; Farmer, 2009, p. 13; Feller, 2006, p. 514. 
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called upon states to take appropriate measures.5 Some commentators say 
that the events of September 11 meant a turning point in international 
refugee law.6 Globalization has left states increasingly vulnerable to external 
threats in the form of terrorism. To keep the threat out many states are 
adopting more restrictive immigration laws. However, these restrictions 
may be impeaching the rights of refugees and fundamental human rights.7 
During the World Refugee Day in 2015, the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Antonio Guterres, declared that international refugee protection is 
at risk as more wealthy countries are breaching their international 
obligations.8  
 
The principle of non-refoulement sets forth an obligation on the 
international community to guarantee all persons the protection from being 
returned to a place where they are at risk of persecution or danger.9 The 
principle is relevant in several contexts, and besides being a cornerstone of 
international refugee law,10 the principle can be found in numerous 
international and regional human rights treaties. The observance of non-
refoulement is deeply linked to the determination of refugee status.11 This 
means that the procedures for identifying refugee status must ensure a 
protection against refoulement.12 
 
Non-refoulement is most famously expressed in Article 33 of the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention). 
The first paragraph of the article states that no party to the treaty shall expel 
or return a refugee to the territory where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion. The second paragraph states that 
the benefits of the first paragraph cannot be claimed by a refugee if there are 
                                                
5 See for example UNSCR 1372, UNSCR 1456 and UNSCR 1566. 
6 Bruin and Wouters, 2003, p. 6.  
7 Farmer, 2009, pp.14-15. 
8 http://www.unhcr.org/55842cb46.html last accessed 2015-06-21. 
9 UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement, 1997. 
10 Goodwin-Gill, 1996, p. 137. 
11 UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement, 1997. 
12 Ibid. 
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reasonable grounds to regard him as a danger to the security of the country 
in which he is, or if he has been convicted of a particularly serious crime 
and therefore constitutes a danger to the community of the country he is in. 
These exceptions, which are outlined in the second paragraph, will be 
referred to as the national security exception and the public order exception.  
 
At the time of the drafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the idea of 
exceptions to non-refoulement was controversial, as the principle was 
considered so fundamental that no exceptions should be allowed.13 
However, as global security threats have developed to a new level, states 
seem to be increasingly willing to accept that there may be exceptions to 
non-refoulement. As illustrated in multiple cases of domestic courts, as well 
as regional and international courts, many states apply a balancing act 
between the right of the individual and the national security of the state. 
Whether or not such a balancing act is permissible can have immense 
repercussions for the future of refugee protection.  
 
1.2 Purpose and research question 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the current status of the principle of 
non-refoulement within the context of counter-terrorism. More specific, 
does international law allow for the application of a so-called balancing act 
under the national security exception to non-refoulement? 
 
In order to answer this question we must first examine the status of non-
refoulement in international refugee law and human rights law. Thus, is non-
refoulement an absolute right? It is also relevant to address the status of non-
refoulement as a rule of international customary law and as a peremptory 
norm.  
                                                
13 Farmer, 2009, p. 10. 
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1.3 Delimitation 
Non-refoulement, in its standing as one of the most fundamental principles 
of international law, is a wide topic. This thesis will only aim to answer a 
narrow question with regard to the application of the principle – specifically 
the application of the national security exception in the name of counter-
terrorism. 
 
The research question implies an analysis of counter-terrorism measures and 
how these implicate refugee protection. This is slightly misleading and 
requires clarification in two matters. Firstly, as the focus of the thesis is the 
legal question of if and how the interest of the state to combat terrorism can 
be balanced with the rights of individuals seeking international protection, 
specific national or international counter-terrorism measures or legislation 
will not be discussed in any detail. Secondly, the research question does not 
only cover the right to non-refoulement for those recognized as refugees by 
domestic or international law, but for all individuals seeking international 
protection.  
 
Lastly, the author would like to address the geographical focus of the thesis. 
There is no doubt that a Eurocentric approach to the research question is 
highly problematic. It would be both misleading and ignorant to cast the 
research question as a problem mainly faced by the “Western world” 
considering that Asian, Middle Eastern and African countries host the vast 
majority of displaced persons in the world. However, while these countries 
deal with mostly uncontrolled and unorganized mass influxes of people 
where the majority of refugees are illegal and unregistered, most Western 
countries have established systems for controlled immigration. Furthermore, 
although fundamentally opposed reiterating the notion that the development 
of international law should simply follow the conduct of the United States 
and the European Union, the author recognizes that the dynamics of world 
politics cannot be ignored when establishing the international lex lata.   
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1.4 Methodology and outline 
The research question seeks to establish lex lata, the current law. In order to 
do so, relevant international instruments and jurisprudence will be analyzed. 
Case law, from international and regional courts as well as national courts, 
will also provide a source of information. Further information will be 
derived from the preparatory work to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 
travaux préparatoires, as well as doctrine. Soft law in the form of 
guidelines, recommendations and comments by different UN human rights 
bodies also provide valuable information. The research question will be 
approached using a mainly inter-legal critical perspective.  
 
The purpose of the thesis is to establish whether or not international law 
allows for the application of a so-called balancing act in cases where the 
individual faces refoulement, but said individual is also posing a threat to 
the security of the nation he or she is in. Firstly, the scope and nature of the 
principle of non-refoulement must be established within its different 
contexts – refugee law, human rights law and customary law. Secondly, the 
national security exception will be examined. Furthermore, counter-
terrorism measures of relevance will be briefly discussed to create a 
background to the analysis. The application of the national security 
exception in various national courts will be examined. Lastly, this thesis will 
conclude with an establishment of lex lata and a discussion on the 
application of a balancing act between non-refoulement and national 
security.  
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2 The principle of non-
refoulement 
2.1 Non-refoulement in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention 
The principle of non-refoulement prohibits states from returning a refugee 
or asylum seeker to a territory where his or her life or freedom would be 
threatened.14 The principle is expressed in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, which states that: 
 
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return(‘refouler’) a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion. 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed 
by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a 
danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having 
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 
 
The first paragraph of the article sets out the prohibition on refoulement, 
while the second paragraph lists the exceptions to the principle. In the 
context of the 1951 Refugee Convention Article 1F is also relevant when 
addressing the exceptions to non-refoulement. Article 1F of the 1951 
Refugee Convention states that: 
 
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with 
respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: 
(a)  he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime 
against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn 
up to make provision in respect of such crimes;  
                                                
14 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 89. 
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(b)  he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the 
country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;  
(c)  he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations.  
 
As seen by the wording of the article, it excludes the individual from the 
Convention. As a result, Article 33 will not be applicable, nor will any other 
articles of the Convention. For a distinction between Article 33(2) and 
Article 1F see section 3.2.  
 
Article 33(1) sets out the prohibition of refoulement. The wording of the 
provision should be interpreted within the context of the treaty as a whole.15 
The object and purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention is also relevant for 
the interpretation of the provision.16 The wording ”in any manner 
whatsoever” means that the prohibition must be interpreted expansively.17 
The choice of words suggests that all types of removal of a person is 
included, without regard to the formal description (deportation, expulsion, 
return, rejection etc.).18 Furthermore, there is no indication that the 
prohibition does not include extradition.19 
 
There is no general right to asylum in international law. However, this does 
not mean that states can reject asylum seekers who have a well-founded fear 
of persecution at the frontier. States may in these cases remove the asylum 
seeker to a safe third country or adopt another solution that does not amount 
to refoulement.20 
 
The protection of Article 33(1) is afforded the refugee. Pursuant to Article 
1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and amended by Article I(2) of the 
1967 Protocol, a refugee is a person who:  
                                                
15 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p.108. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p.112. 
18 Ibid. 
19 The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux préparatoires analysed with a Commentary 
by Dr. Paul Weis, 1990, pp. 341-342. 
20 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p.113. 
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Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
 
However, the prohibition on refoulement does not only apply to those who 
have been formally recognized as refugees, as this recognition is usually a 
result of domestic law.21 The wording of Article 1A(2) tells us that the 
Convention applies to any person ”owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted…”. This means that any person who has satisfied the conditions 
of Article 1A(2) is a refugee under the Convention, whether or not the 
person has been recognized as such by domestic law.22 Subsequently, 
refugees who are illegally residing in the country of refuge will also be 
included. For this reason, the term ’refugee’ will from now on be used in 
this thesis with regard to persons who satisfy the conditions of Article 
1A(2), regardless of any domestic recognition.  
 
Refoulement is prohibited to the ”frontiers of territories where his 
life or freedom would be threatened…”. This does not only include 
the refugee’s country of origin. The reference is made to the plural – 
“territories”. This means refoulement is prohibited to any territory in 
which the person will risk his or her life or freedom.23  The word 
“territories” is used instead of “countries” or “states”, implicating 
that the legal status of the territory is irrelevant.24 The prohibition 
also includes removals to a third state if there is a risk of the 
                                                
21 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p.116. 
22 See Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 2011, para. 28. 
23 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, pp. 121-122. 
24 Ibid. 
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individual being removed from there to a territory where he or she 
would be at risk – so-called chain-refoulement.25 
 
”Where his life or freedom would be threatened” is directly related 
to the definition of a refugee in Article 1A(2) – ”well-founded fear of 
persecution”.26 Consequently, ”where his life or freedom would be 
threatened” should be read to include the territories in which the 
person has a ”well-founded fear of persecution”. Similarly, the 
nature of the threat – “on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion” – 
imports  the wording of the definition in Article 1A(2). 
 
The provision binds the Contracting States, which refers to all the 
states party to the Convention. Pursuant to Article I(1) of the 1967 
Protocol, it also refers to all states party to the Protocol whether or 
not they are party to the Convention. In line with general principles 
of state responsibility, the provision applies to all organs of the 
Contracting State or other persons or bodies exercising governmental 
authority.27 It also includes organs of other states, private 
undertakings, or other persons acting on behalf of a Contracting 
State or in exercise of the governmental activity of that state.28 The 
application is not constricted to the conducts occurring within the 
territory of the Contracting State. In general, states are responsible 
for conducts in relation to persons who are subject to their 
jurisdiction. 29 Both the Human Rights Committee and the European 
Court of Human Rights have addressed the more precise meaning of 
this phrase.30  
 
                                                
25 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, pp. 121-122. 
26 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 123. 
27 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 108. 
28 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 109. 
29 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 110. 
30 See for example Loizidou v. Turkey and Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay. 
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2.2 Non-refoulement in human rights law 
2.2.1 The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) prohibits 
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The ICCPR does this in the 
form of a right, but this right creates a positive obligation on member states 
to safeguard the individual from such ill treatment through legislation and 
other necessary measures.31Article 7 of the ICCPR states that: 
 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his 
free consent to medical or scientific experimentation. 
 
The right is absolute and no exceptions are allowed, pursuant to Article 4.2 
of the Covenant. Under no circumstances may a violation of the article be 
excused.32 Although the article does not include a reference to non-
refoulement, such a right is implied according to the Human Rights 
Committee’s (HRC) General Comment No. 20.33 The HRC clarified the 
non-refoulement obligation in General Comment No. 31 by stating that also 
its Article 2, requiring all State Parties to respect and ensure the Covenant 
rights for all persons in their territory and under their control, entails a non-
refoulement obligation.34 State Parties may not remove a person to a 
territory where there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk 
of irreparable harm. This obligation also includes chain-refoulement.35 
 
The non-refoulement obligations under the ICCPR are subject to no 
exceptions, and national security considerations cannot excuse a violation of 
Article 7.36 In a number of observations of country reports, the HRC has 
established that counter-terrorism measures taken by states in connection to 
                                                
31 See CCPR General Comment No. 20, para. 2. 
32 See CCPR General Comment No. 20, para. 3. 
33 See CCPR General Comment No. 20, para. 9. 
34 See CCPR General Comment No. 20, para 12. 
35 Persaud, 2006, p. 7. 
36 Persaud, 2006, p.8-9. 
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UNSCR 1373 do not absolve states from their obligations under the 
ICCPR.37  
 
2.2.2 The Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
 
Article 3.1 of the Convention against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) contains an absolute prohibition 
on refoulement. The paragraph states that: 
 
No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 
	  
This provision is an enforcement of the underlying peremptory38 norm, the 
prohibition on torture.39 The prohibition only includes torture, not 
‘inhuman’ or ‘degrading’ treatment, and is thus less wide than the provision 
in the ICCPR. However, like in the ICCPR, the prohibition on refoulement 
under the CAT is absolute, also in the context of national security concerns, 
as established in the case Agiza v Sweden.40 The Committee Against Torture 
has also established that the prohibition on refoulement to face torture under 
the CAT extends to chain-refoulement.41  
 
Read together with Article 16.2, and subsequently the exceptions allowed 
for in Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, it is possible to argue 
that the CAT leaves an opening for derogation from Article 3. Article 16.2 
states that: 
                                                
37 See Human Rights Committee: Concluding observations: Lithuania, 2004, para. 7; UN 
Human Rights Committee: Concluding Observations: Yemen 2005, para. 13; UN Human 
Rights Committee: Concluding Observations: Morocco, 2004, para. 13. 
38 The peremptory status of the prohibition on torture is widely accepted. See for example 
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzia, ICTY, 1998, para. 153. For further explanation on 
peremptory norms of international law, see section 2.4. 
39 Farmer, 2009, p. 19. 
40 Agiza v Sweden, para. 13.8.  
41 Duffy, 2008, p. 380. 
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The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the provisions of 
any other international instrument or national law which prohibits cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or which relates to 
extradition or expulsion. 
In light of the exceptions to non-refoulement in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, the absolute and non-derogable prohibition on torture in the 
CAT may seem like a contradiction. However, according to the travaux 
préparatoires of the CAT, Article 16 was intended to leave the door open 
for other legal instruments providing greater protection against torture.42 
This statement will seriously undermine any attempt of using Article 16.2 to 
narrow the protection against torture. 
2.2.3 The European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
 
Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) establishes that: 
 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.  
 
Article 3 protects one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. 
Through jurisprudence, it has been established that the article also 
encompasses a prohibition on refoulement.43 Unlike the protection against 
refoulement in the 1951 Refugee Convention, Article 3 of the ECHR 
protects not only those who are refugees under the Convention – everyone 
has the right to not be sent to a territory where they would face a real risk of 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.44  
 
                                                
42 See Duffy, 2008, p. 380. 
43 See Soering v United Kingdom; Vilvarajah and Others v United Kingdom, para. 103. 
44 Duffy, 2008, p. 378. 
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The rights afforded by Article 3 are absolute and no exceptions or 
derogations can be made, not even in cases of public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation.45 This was upheld in the landmark case Soering v the 
United Kingdom where the extradition of a German national from the 
United Kingdom to the United States was found to violate Article 3.46 
 
Subsequently, in the case Chahal v the United Kingdom, the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) established that the absolute nature of Article 3 
also covers its application in expulsion cases. Chahal was a Sikh and an 
Indian national seeking asylum in the United Kingdom. He was 
subsequently denied protection and detained awaiting deportation. The 
British authorities argued that he could not enjoy the rights under Article 
33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, since he was considered a threat to 
the security of the nation.47 An applicant’s risk of persecution upon return to 
his country of origin had to be weighed against the interest of the nation.48 
In its ruling, the ECtHR firstly held that the expulsion of an alien may 
activate the prohibition on torture or cruel and inhuman treatment and 
punishment in Article 3 of the Convention.49 In cases where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that the alien upon return would face 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Article 3 implies 
an obligation not to expel that person to that country.50 The activities of this 
person is irrelevant, however dangerous or undesirable.51 Consequently, the 
ECtHR concluded that the protection afforded by Article 3 of the ECHR is 
wider than the protection under Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.52  
 
In the case Ahmad v the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom wanted to 
extradite suspected terrorists to face trial and probable “super maximum-
                                                
45 See Ireland v United Kingdom, para. 65; Vilvarajah and Others v United Kingdom, para, 
108; Soering v United Kingdom, para. 88. 
46 Soering v United Kingdom, para. 88. 
47 Chahal v United Kingdom, para. 41. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Chahal v United Kingdom, para. 74. 
50 Ibid; see also Soering v United Kingdom, paras. 90-91 
51 Chahal v United Kingdom, para. 80. 
52 Chahal v United Kingdom, para. 80. 
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security imprisonment” in the United States. The ECtHR found no breach of 
Article 3 in the case, not because the applicants were alleged terrorists but 
because the ECtHR did not find that the conditions of the detention facilities 
in the United States or the prospect of life imprisonment per se were in 
breach of Article 3.53 Even if the Court rejected a relativist approach to 
Article 3, the Court held that what constitutes ill treatment under Article 3 is 
context-specific.54  
 
In Saadi v Italy in 2009, the United Kingdom argued again, as an 
intervening party, that in cases of suspected terrorists the interest of the 
individual to not face ill treatment must be weighed against the security 
interest of the state.55 As in the Chahal-case, the ECtHR rejected the United 
Kingdom’s argument, stating that the rights under Article 3 are absolute and 
no derogation from the rule can be made. 
 
The absolute and categorical approach to Article 3 by the ECtHR was 
further established in the 2011 case of Gäfgen v Germany, where the court 
held that “even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against 
terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of 
the conduct of the person concerned. The nature of the offence allegedly 
committed by the applicant is therefore irrelevant for the purposes of 
art.3.”56 
 
The Court, therefore, leaves no room for balancing the rights under Article 3 
with other interests such as the state’s interest in combatting terrorism.57 
 
                                                
53 Ahmad v United Kingdom, paras. 218-224. 
54 Ahmad v United Kingdom, para. 242. 
55 Saadi v Italy, para. 138. 
56 Gäfgen v Germany, para. 87. 
57 Mavronicola and Messineo, 2013, p. 593. 
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2.3 Other regional treaties 
Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) 
prohibits exploitation or degradation of a man, in particular slavery, slave 
trade, torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. This provision is 
absolute and contains an implied prohibition of refoulement.58 Similarly, the 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) contains a prohibition on 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The ACHR 
also explicitly prohibits refoulement in Article 22(8). However, the 
prohibition on refoulement is not absolute, pursuant to Article 27 of the 
ACHR it may be derogated from in times of public emergency. The Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also explicitly prohibits 
refoulement in absolute terms in article 19(2). The Organization of African 
Unity’s 1969 Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa (OAU Convention) Article II(3) prohibits refoulement and permits 
no exceptions.  Art 27(1) of the Convention states that national security 
concerns cannot excuse a violation of asylum responsibilities. 
 
2.4 Non-refoulement in international 
customary law 
International customary law is created if two components are combined – 
consistent state practice and opinio juris.59 This essentially means that 
customary law reflects a broad international consensus.60 There is no 
question that the prohibition on torture constitutes a rule of international 
custamary law.61 It could be argued that non-refoulement is a fundamental 
component of the customary rule of the prohibition on torture.62 It could 
also be argued that the principle of non-refoulement on its own has become 
a rule of international customary law. Let us focus on the latter issue.  
                                                
58 Bruin and Wouters, 2003, p. 23. 
59 Duffy, 2008, p. 384. 
60 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 151. 
61 Duffy, 2008, p. 384. 
62 Ibid. 
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The 1951 Refugee Convention, the ICCPR and the CAT all recognize non-
refoulement as a fundamental right. The treaties have 145, 168 and 158 state 
parties respectively out of the 193 states in the world recognized by the 
UN.63 The ECHR, with probably the most developed protection against 
refoulement, binds almost all European states.64 The principle of non-
refoulement is also recognized in various other human rights treaties, 
UNHCR conclusions, UN General Assembly Resolutions and regional 
treaties and declarations.65 The status of non-refoulement as a rule of 
international customary law has been debated for decades. Continued 
negative state practice constitute valid reasons for questioning the existing 
of the customary rule.66 Yet, according to multiple commentators, there is 
no doubt that non-refoulement is a rule of international customary law.67 It 
is, however, not clear what the scope of the rule is. It is hard to determine 
what version has acquired the status of a rule of international customary 
law, considering the differences between the scope of the principle in the 
different international legal instruments. According to Lauterpacht and 
Bethlehem one must distinguish between the customary principle that has 
developed in refugee law and the one that has developed in human rights 
law.68 The customary rule that has developed in international refugee law 
permits exceptions to non-refoulement for national security och public 
safety reasons.69 However, exceptions to the rule cannot be made within the 
scope of the prohibiton on torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, or other non-derogable customary principles of human 
rights.70 The customary rule in human rights law, on the other hand, 
                                                
63 See the United Nations Treaty Collection website and the United Nations website for an 
updated number of state parties. There is no consensus on the number of states in the world, 
but most would agree there are somewhere between 190 and 200 states.  
64 See the Council of Europe website. 
65 See Duffy, 2008, pp. 383-389. 
66 Coleman, 2003, p. 23. 
67 See for example Duffy, 2008, p. 389; Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 155; Allain, 
2001, p. 538; Goodwin-Gill, 1996. 
68 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 149. 
69 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, pp. 149-150. 
70 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 150.
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categorically rejects of the recognition of exceptions to non-refoulement.71 
This has been established by the expression of the principle in human rights 
treaties as well as affirmation of the principles absolute nature by both the 
HRC and the ECtHR.72 
 
2.5 Non-refoulement as a peremptory 
norm 
A peremptory norm, or a jus cogens norm, is a principle of international 
customary law that is absolute and non-derogable. Under no circumstances 
can an exception to a peremptory norm be considered.73 The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) defines peremptory norms as “a 
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character”. Thereby, a peremptory norm is an absolute norm that is 
binding upon the entire international community, superseding state consent. 
However, there is little consensus on which norms of international law 
constitute peremptory norms. The prohibition on torture, however, is 
commonly used as a rather uncontroversial example.74  
 
Non-refoulement is, as previously stated, one of the fundamental principles 
of international refugee law. It is also, as stated above, widely considered a 
part of international customary law. There are therefore reasons for 
contemplating whether or not non-refoulement could have gained the status 
of a peremptory norm.  
 
According to Allain, non-refoulement is emerging as a peremptory norm.75 
The two aspects of what constitutes a peremptory norm are satisfied in the 
                                                
71 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 162. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Duffy, 2008, p. 389. 
74 See Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 152; CCPR General Comment No. 24. 
75 Farmer, 2009, p. 22. 
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case of non-refoulement – that it is accepted by the international community 
as a whole, and that it is a norm that is non-derogable.76 
 
Some argue that state practice does not fully support the acceptance of non-
refoulement as a peremptory norm, considering multiple states continuously 
violate the principle.77 However, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has 
stated in Nicaragua v the United States, that violations of a norm are not 
necessarily relevant to its status as a jus cogens norm.78 On the contrary, the 
ICJ states that if states act in a way which is prima facie incompatible with a 
rule, but then defends its actions by referring to exceptions within the rule, 
such conduct confirms rather than weakens the rule.79 
 
Whether or not non-refoulement has gained peremptory status is highly 
relevant for the continued discussion on the exceptions to non-refoulement. 
The result of considering non-refoulement as a peremptory norm would be 
that any type of legislation permitting refoulement would be inacceptable, 
thus hindering states from impeaching on the rights of the refugee.80 It could 
even be considered that an elevation of the principle of non-refoulement to 
peremptory status could nullify the provision of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, pursuant to Article 53 of the VCLT.81 
 
 
                                                
76 Allain, 2001, pp. 538-539. 
77 Farmer, 2009, p. 27; Allain, 2001, p. 539. 
78 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, para. 98. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Farmer, 2009, p. 26. 
81 Duffy, 2008, pp. 389-390; Article 53 of the VCLT states that a treaty is void if it conflicts 
with a peremptory norm of general international law.  
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3 Non-refoulement and national 
security 
3.1 Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention 
 
Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention states that the right to non-
refoulement cannot be claimed by a refugee “whom there are reasonable 
grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he 
is”. 
 
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem have commented on the interpretation and 
application of the national security exception in Article 33(2). Firstly, they 
state that the nature of the exception is clearly prospective – future danger is 
what is material, as opposed to the individual’s past conduct.82 Yet, while 
assessing the prospective danger past conduct may be relevant. Furthermore, 
the danger in question must be directed at the security of the country of 
refuge. The exception does not deal with the prospect of danger to the 
security of other countries or the international community as a whole.83 
Such an interpretation would, according to Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, be 
inconsistent with the humanitarian and fundamental nature of the 
prohibition against refoulement. This interpretation is supported by 
developments on the application of non-refoulement as an absolute right in 
human rights law, regardless of the conduct of the individual.84 However, in 
the famous Suresh-case85, the Canadian Supreme Court rejects this 
approach, stating that the national security of one state is dependent on the 
security of other states.86 Referring to the events of September 11 2001, the 
Canadian Supreme Court state that the notion that terrorism in one country 
                                                
82 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 135. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 The case is addressed in section 3.4.1. 
86 Suresh v Canada, para. 87. 
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does not implicate other countries is no longer valid. Although, according to 
the wording of the exception in Article 33(2) there needs to be a danger to 
the country of refuge. Despite the changing nature of national security 
threats post 9/11, the mere possibility of adverse repercussion seems 
insufficient for applying the national security exception.87 
 
Article 33(2) does not specify what kind of acts that would fall into the 
scope of the national security exception or what standard of proof is 
sufficient.88 The only limit to the scope of the provision in the text of the 
Convention is that there must be ‘reasonable grounds’. According to 
Farmer, this opens for a broad application of the exception.89 However, 
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem mean that states can exercise only a limited 
margin of appreciation in these cases. States cannot act arbitrarily or 
capriciously, as there must be reasonable grounds for regarding the refugee 
as a danger to the security of the country of refuge.90 Relevant authorities 
must assess the prospective danger and they must support their conclusion 
with evidence.91 In general, there must be a high threshold for the 
application of the exception in Article 33(2), due to the fundamental 
character of non-refoulement as well as the humanitarian character of the 
1951 Refugee Convention.92 However, Lauterpacht and Bethlehem do not 
specify the level of danger to the security of the country further than stating 
that it must be very serious. They do state that the threshold of danger in 
Article 33(2) is higher than that of Article 1F, which deals with crimes of 
particularly grave nature.93 Consequently, it would be inconsistent with the 
Convention to interpret the word ‘danger’ in Article 33(2) as anything less 
than very serious danger.  
 
                                                
87 Bruin and Wouters, 2003, p.18. 
88 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 135. 
89 Farmer, 2009, pp. 9-10. 
90 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 135. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 136. 
93 Ibid. 
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The UNHCR has commented that, considering the serious consequences of 
returning a refugee to a country where he is in danger of persecution, the 
exception in Article 33(2) must be applied with great caution. It is also 
necessary to consider all the circumstances of the case.94 
 
A restrictive interpretation of the word ‘danger’ in the exceptions to non-
refoulement can also be supported by the fact that a number of states where 
reluctant to the inclusion of any exceptions of non-refoulement in the 
Convention.95 During the preparatory work to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, the traveaux préparatoires, the introduction of exceptions to 
the prohibition on refoulement was controversial.96 While countries such as 
the United Kingdom, Israel and Switzerland expressed the wish to rightfully 
expel an undesirable alien in exceptional cases, the United States’ 
representative considered it highly undesirable to in any way impair the 
prohibition on refoulement to a territory where a man was at risk of death or 
persecution, even in very exceptional cases.97 Similarly, the French 
representative considered such impairment inhuman and contrary to the 
purpose of the Convention. Conversely, while non-refoulement was 
considered so fundamental that it should allow for no exceptions, there was 
an evident reluctance to recognize an international right to asylum.98 An 
individual’s right to asylum was excluded in both the 1948 Universal 
Decleration on Human Rights (UDHR) and the 1951 Refugee Convention.99 
 
The modern day discourse on the exceptions to non-refoulement paints a 
different picture. The United Kingdom remains insistent on their right to 
expel a refugee who is posing a danger to their national security, albeit 
within the boundaries set by the ECtHR.100 The United States, on the other 
                                                
94 UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement, 1997. 
95 Commentary of the Refugee Convention 1951 (Articles 2-11, 13-37), 1997, p. 139. 
96 The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux préparatoires analysed with a Commentary 
by Dr. Paul Weis, 1990, pp. 233-235.  
97 The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux préparatoires analysed with a Commentary 
by Dr. Paul Weis, 1990, pp. 234-235. 
98 Farmer, 2009, p. 10. 
99 Ibid. 
100 See sections 2.2.4 and 3.4.2.  
 26 
hand, seems to have shifted their stance on exceptions to non-
refoulement.101 This shift is can probably be explained by the advent of a 
global and constant threat of terrorism, or at least the perception of such a 
threat. 
 
Pursuant to Article 31.1 of the VCLT, treaties shall be interpreted in light of 
their object and purpose, a so-called teleological interpretation. However, 
the political climate 60 years after the conclusion of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention is adversely different and there are undeniable reasons today to 
believe that many states do not share the same view on the exceptions to 
non-refoulement. Therefore, a more dynamic interpretation of the provision 
could lead to a different conclusion on the scope of the exceptions in Article 
33(2).  
 
The exceptions in Article 33(2) essentially amount to a compromise 
between the danger to a refugee from refoulement and the danger to the 
security of his or her country of refuge from their conduct.102  Therefore, the 
principle of proportionality must be considered, allowing states to weigh the 
danger faced by the refugee by return with the danger the refugee is posing 
to the security of the country of refuge.103 This conclusion is remarkable as 
it essentially authorizes states to apply a balancing act in cases where a 
refugee is considered a threat to national security. However, according to 
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, states must comply strictly with the prohibition 
on refoulement in cases where the refugee is risking exposure to torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or any risk within the scope of any 
other non-derogable human right.104  
 
                                                
101 See Farmer, 2009, p. 97. 
102 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 135. 
103 The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux préparatoires analysed with a Commentary 
by Dr. Paul Weis, 1990, p. 342. 
104 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 138. 
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3.2 Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention 
Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention establishes a mechanism for 
exclusion from refugee status. Under Article 1F, the individual is not 
considered a refugee at all. Whereas under Article 33(2), the individual is 
considered a refugee, but withheld the right to non-refoulement.105  The 
relationship between the two articles is complex and there is an evident 
overlap between the provisions.106 The purpose of Article 1F is to define 
who can and who cannot claim the rights of the Convention. Article 33(2) 
on the other hand serves to protect the country of refuge.107  
 
While Article 33(2) is silent as to when and where crimes should be 
committed, Article 1F refers to crimes committed outside the country of 
refuge prior to admission, at least according to some commentators.108 
However, crimes committed outside the country of refuge are not 
necessarily excluded from Article 33(2), if the refugee is considered a 
danger to the security of the country he or she is in.109 
 
Article 1F is more restrictive in its wording than Article 33(2). According to 
Article 1F there must be “serious reasons to consider” compared to the 
“reasonable grounds” of Article 33(2).110 On the other hand, Article 33(2) 
indicates a higher threshold as it must be established that there is a future 
threat to the country of refuge instead of the past conduct of a person 
relevant for the application of Article 1F.111 As a result, it is unlikely that a 
person who is not excluded under Article 1F will satisfy the higher 
threshold of Article 33(2).112 
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110 Farmer, 2009, p. 11. 
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According to Farmer, relying on Article 33(2) to provide national security is 
unnecessary as Article 1F already fills this need, providing opportunity to 
exclude those from refugee status who have committed terrorist acts.113 
Relying on Article 33(2) in cases of security concerns will therefore 
undermine refugee protection.114 
 
3.3 Non-refoulement and counter-
terrorism 
There is no international consensus on the definition of terrorism.115 There 
is also no uniform international list of terrorist organizations.116 The 
classification of an organization as a terrorist organization is highly 
politically motivated, which subsequently renders the definition of terrorism 
highly political. Therefore, this thesis deals with terrorism as a non-legal 
term.  
 
Shortly after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 
September 2001, the UNSC issued resolution 1373, calling upon states to 
combat terrorism. The resolution called upon states to exclude from refugee 
status, pursuant to Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention, those who 
have planned, facilitated or participated in terrorist crimes.117 The resolution 
did not include a definition on terrorism; subsequently such a definition was 
left to the discretion of states.118 In 2003, UNSC resolution 1456, also 
dealing with counter-terrorism, made a reference to human rights 
considerations when combatting terrorism and resolution 1566 subsequently 
spelled out a contextual definition on terrorism.  
 
According to Bruin and Wouters, the mere membership of a terrorist 
organization cannot be considered a terrorist act. However, there is a danger 
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115 Bruin and Wouters, 2003, p. 5. 
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that the fact that an individual is a member of a particular terrorist 
organization will suffice to, in practice, exclude the individual from refugee 
status or the protection against refoulement.119 The United States currently 
rely heavily on the language of the national security exception in Article 
33(2) to exclude the right to non-refoulement with regard to refugees who 
are suspected to have links to terrorism.120  
 
Since the events of September 11 2001, many states have imposed stricter 
counter-terror measures.121 There is a great potential for national security 
concerns to be prioritized over refugee protection, given current concerns of 
global terrorism.122 According to Bruin and Wouters, states are responsible 
not only to protect individuals in need of protection, but also to hold 
individuals criminally accountable for their acts. The current practice of 
exclusion and expulsion neglects both these responsibilities.123 The 
objective of asylum law is to protect the individual from violations of 
fundamental human rights. This objective has, post 9/11 and the advent of 
global terrorism, become subject for discussion.124 This is further evidence 
of the politicization of asylum law and how the current approach to the “war 
on terrorism” is harmful to human rights.125  
 
3.4 A balancing act? 
3.4.1 Suresh v Canada (MCI) 
In the leading decision of Suresh v Canada (MCI) of 2002, the Canadian 
Supreme Court held that in exceptional cases, deportation to face torture 
could be justified. The findings of the case have been subject to criticism, 
but as the Canadian Supreme Court applies a ‘balancing act’ it is highly 
interesting from the point of view of this thesis.  
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Suresh, a Sri Lankan national, was recognized as a refugee by the Canadian 
IRB in 1991.126 Suresh was subsequently found inadmissible as an 
immigrant on security grounds and detained awaiting deportation in 1995.127 
The decision was based on the opinion of the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service who suspected Suresh of being a member and a fundraiser for the 
Sri Lankan terrorist organization The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelem, an 
organization also active in Canada.  
 
The Canadian Supreme Court found that torture was fundamentally unjust 
under Canadian law, and that it is also rejected in international law 
regardless of security concerns.128 However, they rejected the idea that 
Canadian authorities may never deport a person to face such treatment 
elsewhere.129 In these cases, there must be a balancing between the 
considerations of the individual seeking protection, and the security 
concerns of Canada.130 The interest of the state to combat terrorism and 
protecting the public should be balanced against the particular 
circumstances of the person whom the government seeks to expel.131 It is 
essentially a question of proportionality – is the proposed response 
reasonable in relation to the posed threat?132 Consequently, the Court found 
that deportation to face torture could be justified in exceptional cases as a 
consequence of this balancing process.133 However, even if balance rarely 
will be struck in favor of expulsion in cases where there is a serious risk of 
torture, it must be determined by discretion on a case-to-case basis.134 
 
The Committee Against Torture criticized this, so-called ‘Suresh-
exception’. They expressed concerns about the Canadian failure to 
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recognize the absolute and non-derogable nature of Article 3 of the CAT.135 
Similarly, the HRC found that the type of balancing act adopted by the 
Canadian Court in no way could justify deportation to face torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.136 The HRC rejected the idea that any 
person, whatever danger he or she might pose to the security of a state and 
regardless of any state of emergency, may be deported to face a risk of such 
ill treatment. 
 
3.4.2 Cases before the European Court of 
Human Rights 
As seen under section 2.2.3, the ECtHR has established the absolute nature 
of the prohibition on refoulement to face torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment in numerous cases. The ECtHR has also addressed the notion of 
“a balancing act” in a number of cases.  
 
In Chahal v the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom argued that the 
protection under Article 3 was not absolute in expulsion cases. In these 
cases, an alien posing a real threat to the national security of the state could 
be expelled even if there existed a real risk of ill treatment. The United 
Kingdom referred, in support of this argument, inter alia to the limitations 
in Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention.137 As an alternative to this 
argument, the United Kingdom argued that the risk for the individual must 
be balanced with the threat posed to the State by the individual, in cases 
where issues under Article 3 are considered. The greater the risk of ill 
treatment, the less weight should be accorded to the threat to national 
security.138 The Court held that, even though aware of the difficulties faced 
by states to protect their communities from terrorist violence, the prohibition 
on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment is absolute and irrespective of 
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the individuals own behavior.139 Article 3 is equally absolute in cases of 
expulsion – subsequently a Contracting State is obligated to safeguard an 
individual from the threat of such ill treatment. The activities of this person 
is irrelevant, however dangerous or undesirable.140 
 
Thus, the rights under Article 3 are absolute, and not relative. However, the 
assessment of what constitutes “torture”, “inhuman” and “degrading” 
treatment might be relative as it depends on the circumstances of the case. 
As the ECtHR noted in Ahmad v the United Kingdom, life imprisonment 
could potentially breach Article 3, but only if it is grossly disproportionate 
to the crime committed.141 This approach has led some commentators to 
interpret the rights under Article 3 as relative.142 Mavronicola and Messineo 
state that at least in practice, the assessment of the Court will be context-
specific and in that way, relative.143 However, this “relativism” in the 
application and assessment of the terms of Article 3 does not undermine its 
absolute nature.144  
 
In Ramzy v Netherlands an individual faced expulsion but claimed he was in 
danger of ill treatment violating Article 3 upon return to Algeria. The 
Netherlands judged that his involvement in terrorist activities rendered him 
a threat to national security. The governments of Lithuania, Portugal, 
Slovakia and the United Kingdom jointly intervened. The governments’ 
stated that in cases of removal to face ill treatment prohibited by Article 3, 
national security considerations could not be dismissed as irrelevant. The 
rights of the citizens of Contracting States who are threatened by terrorism 
must be afforded weight.145 The Court never addressed the issue, as the case 
was struck out of the list.146  
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3.4.3 House of Lords – R (On the application of 
Wellington) 
In 2008, the authorities of the United Kingdom persisted in its relativist 
approach to Article 3 of the ECHR in the Wellington-case, despite the 
ECtHR decision to reject the United Kingdom’s stance on refoulement in 
cases involving suspected terrorists in the Chahal-case.   
 
In Wellington, the majority argued that while there was an absolute 
prohibition on refoulement to face torture, cases involving inhuman or 
degrading treatment must be considered within the context of each case.147 
Therefore, there must be a distinction made between ill treatment breaching 
Article 3 in a domestic context and in an extradition context. Ambiguities in 
the Soering-case formed a base for the argument of the House of Lords.148 
Lord Scott and Lord Brown disagreed with the majority, stating that such 
reasoning generated a relativist approach to the rights under Article 3, which 
would be incompatible with the absolute nature of the article.149 
 
As seen above, the ECtHR disagreed and rejected the relativist approach of 
the House of Lords in Wellington, in Ahmad v the United Kingdom. 
However, while firmly reiterating the stance on the absolute nature of the 
rights under Article 3 in Chahal and Saadi, the ECtHR stated that they 
agreed with the minority in Wellington that not all forms of ill treatment will 
automatically bar removal to another state.150 The Court explained that what 
would be a violation of Article 3 in a domestic context can, on occasion, not 
suffice to find a violation of the article in an extra-territorial context. As an 
example the Court stated that a Contracting State’s negligence in providing 
appropriate medical care could violate Article 3, while it would possibly not 
attain the minimum level of severity for a violation of the article in the 
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extra-territorial context.151 According to Mavronicola and Messineo, the 
Court is essentially applying cultural relativism, saying that what would 
constitute ill treatment under Article 3 in ECHR states might not amount to 
a violation of Article 3 in for example the United States.152 In the Court’s 
own words “save for cases involving the death penalty, it has even more 
rarely found that there would be a violation of Article 3 if an applicant were 
to be removed to a State which had a long history of respect of democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law”.153 
 
3.4.4 UNHCR 
The idea of a balancing act is not unique to national courts. Such an 
approach also seems to be accepted by the UNCHR. According to the 
travaux préparatoires of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the principle of 
proportionality must be observed when applying Article 33(2).154 This 
means that the danger entailed to the refugee by removal must be balanced 
with the menace the refugee would pose to public security.155  
 
 
 
                                                
151 Ahmad v United Kingdom, para. 177. 
152 Mavronicola and Messineo, 2013, p. 601. 
153 Ahmad v United Kingdom, para. 179. 
154 The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux préparatoires analysed with a Commentary 
by Dr. Paul Weis, 1990, p. 246. 
155 Ibid. 
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4 Conclusion 
Non-refoulement is a vital part of refugee protection and protection of 
human rights. The principle is a part of international customary law, and by 
some considered an emerging peremptory norm. It is famously expressed in 
Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as various human rights 
treaties. The status of the principle cannot be generally defined in 
international law. The same can be said about the scope of the principle, 
which depends on the legal context in which it is applied.  
 
It can be concluded, from the above, that non-refoulement in the 1951 
Refugee Convention is a fundamental right. However, it is not an absolute 
right. Firstly, one must be considered a refugee under the Convention to 
enjoy the right to non-refoulement. This means, not only must an individual 
satisfy the terms of Article 1A(2) defining who is a refugee, the individual 
must also avoid exclusion under Article 1F. Furthermore, the second 
paragraph of Article 33 permits exceptions to the principle in cases of public 
order and national security. Therefore, in order to enjoy the right to non-
refoulement under the 1951 Refugee Convention, an individual must satisfy 
the terms of refugee status under the Convention, he or she cannot have 
committed crimes of such nature that he or she could be excluded from 
refugee status, and the country of refuge cannot have reasons to believe he 
or she poses a threat to public order or national security.  In cases where the 
refugee has committed terrorist acts, it is firstly the exclusion clause in 
Article 1F that is relevant. However, the threshold for the exclusion clause 
is very high, and simply being a suspected terrorist, or a member of a 
terrorist organization may not suffice to satisfy the terms of the article. In 
these cases, Article 33(2) becomes highly relevant. Although some 
commentators find the national security exception in Article 33(2) 
superfluous, as terrorist crimes are already covered by the exclusion clause, 
the paragraph is frequently used by states to deny refugees the right to non-
refoulement.  
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Unlike in international refugee law, non-refoulement in international human 
rights law is generally considered an absolute, non-derogable right. Unlike 
the prohibition on refoulement in refugee law, which applies only to 
refugees, the prohibition in human rights law applies to all individuals. 
However, as international refugee law prohibits refoulement to a “territory 
where the persons life or freedom would be threatened”, human rights 
treaties prohibit refoulement to face torture or other ill treatment. These are 
the underlying rights being protected by non-refoulement. 
 
Multiple countries have objected to the categorical approach that especially 
the ECtHR has taken to the prohibition on refoulement. The United 
Kingdom has been a persistent objector to the ECtHR take on non-
refoulement. Furthermore, the cases of Suresh and Wellington are two 
examples of countries applying a relative approach to the application of 
non-refoulement in situations where there are national security concerns.  
 
When establishing whether or not international law allows for a so-called 
balancing act when applying the principle of non-refoulement in the national 
security context, one must consider many aspects. The status of non-
refoulement is inarguably different depending on the context. While the 
prohibition of refoulement to face torture has been declared an absolute 
right by multiple instances, international refugee law recognizes that there 
may be exceptions to non-refoulement. When the principle differs between 
legal contexts it is relevant to decide the hierarchy between the legal 
contexts. This issue will not be addressed here. However, the following 
should be noted.  
 
If a person, not considered a refugee under international law pursuant to 
Article 1F in the 1951 Refugee Convention, is faced with expulsion or 
removal to a territory where he or she risks persecution or another threat to 
his or her life or freedom he or she cannot claim the right of non-
refoulement under the refugee law regime. However, as the principle of non-
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refoulement is a rule of international customary law, the obligation of non-
refoulement will still be relevant in the case. With this in mind, the 
argument that the exceptions under Article 33(2) are obsolete in cases of 
national security concerns since Article 1F already fills the need, is not 
valid. Non-refoulement will still be afforded, either pursuant to a state’s 
commitment to human rights treaties or because the state is bound by the 
rule of international customary law. However, depending on the status of the 
rule in customary law, the exceptions outlined in Article 33(2) may still be 
applied. In this situation, the possible peremptory status of non-refoulement 
is highly relevant. If non-refoulement is a peremptory norm, no exceptions 
may be considered pursuant to the VCLT. If non-refoulement is not a 
peremptory norm, exceptions may be considered and the permissibility of a 
balancing act is highly relevant. It should be noted that even if the principle 
of non-refoulement is not peremptory, the rule has been established as 
absolute by multiple international and regional human rights treaties. What 
can be established is that human rights law, and perhaps even refugee law 
according to some commentators, prohibits refoulement to face torture in 
absolute terms. This would be in line with the general notion that the 
prohibition on torture is a peremptory norm. Although this has been 
contested by states in domestic cases such as Suresh v Canada as well as 
numerous cases subsequently brought before the ECtHR, the human rights 
regime remains clear on the point – the prohibition on refoulement to face 
torture is an absolute right subject to no exceptions whatsoever.  
 
Unlike the prohibition on torture, the prohibition on cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment has not gained the same uncontested status as a 
peremptory norm of international law. Therefore, arguing for an 
international consensus on the absolute prohibition on refoulement to face 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is not as straight forward.   
 
The idea of a balancing the interest of the individual to non-refoulement and 
the interest of a state to safeguard itself from the possible threat of said 
individual is not completely foreign to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Such 
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a balancing act was proposed in the travaux préparatoires when applying 
Article 33(2). There are, however, considerable concerns that the open and 
vague wording of the exception in Article 33(2) leave a substantial room for 
state discretion, and subsequently may open the door for states to act 
arbitrarily or capriciously. To the backdrop of the current global political 
climate, it seems reasonable to suspect states may challenge the perimeters 
of the rule if it seems to be in their best interest.  
 
While the travaux préparatoires of the 1951 Refugee Convention seem to 
permit a balancing act, Lauterpacht and Bethlehem seem adamant no 
exceptions to non-refoulement can be justified where the individual faces 
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. A way to interpret these 
contradictions is to establish that a balancing act under Article 33(2) is 
permitted, as long as it is on par with non-derogable rights of human rights 
law. However, there is no indication in the wording of the article pointing in 
this direction, and the travaux préparatoires only refer to the principle of 
proportionality. 
 
Another relevant factor when considering the permissibility of a balancing 
act between counter terrorism and non-refoulement is if such a balancing act 
in itself is proportional. Proportionality is an established principle in 
international law. Allowing for a balancing act between counter-terrorism 
and non-refoulement applies the principle of proportionality in practice. Yet, 
this argument raises more questions than it answers. How will there be 
guarantees that the legal principle of proportionality is safely maintained by 
political instances weighing the safety of their nation against the interest of 
an alien? As soon as the principle of proportionality is not correctly 
maintained, it opens the door for abuse. Such abuse of a balancing act could 
potentially harm other interests beyond refugee protection – such as non-
discrimination. When considering if a balancing act in itself is a 
proportional means, one must therefore also consider possible harm to other 
interests. Considering the probability of it impeaching on other human 
rights, a balancing act might no longer be proportional.  
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While the ECtHR has rejected the idea that the actions of the individual can 
justify refoulement to face torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, the 
actions of the individual cannot categorically be said to be irrelevant to the 
assessment of what constitutes “torture”, “inhuman” or “degrading” 
treatment. Through the Ahmad-case, the ECtHR seems to have opened the 
door for cultural relativism in the assessment of the terms under Article 3. 
Firstly, by stating that what constitutes torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment in a Contracting State may not constitute torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment in an extra-territorial context. Secondly, the Court 
boldly states that a violation of Article 3 will rarely be found with regard to 
states with a “long history of respect of democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law”. It seems like the Court is proposing a presumption of non-
violation in cases involving removal to a third state which is perceived as a 
state with similar democratic values as the ECHR.  These statements seem 
contradictable towards each other. The ECtHR is proposing in one sentence, 
cultural relativism as to what violates Article 3, yet applies a Eurocentric 
approach to what can be presumed to be a violation of Article 3 or not.  
This reasoning is inconsistent and problematic. The Court did not go into 
detail of what constitutes “respect of democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law”. These are norms that are hard to legally define and in large extent 
dependent on political considerations, which means ECtHR will apply 
different standards of proof depending on how states are politically 
perceived.  To the critical commentator, such practice could undermine the 
rule of law.  
Putting aside the ambiguous reasoning of the ECtHR in Ahmad, there seems 
to be consensus on the absolute nature of the right to non-refoulement to 
face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in human rights law. 
Yet, states keep challenging the absolute nature of the rule in the name of 
counter-terrorism.  
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The HRC has proclaimed that counter-terrorism measures called upon by 
the UNSC do not absolve states from their obligations under human rights 
law. However, it would be incorrect to declare that counter-terrrorism 
measures in the shape of restrictive immigration is, per se, a violation of 
human rights. The purpose of considering national security is, for the state, 
to safeguard human rights for the population of the state. One of the reasons 
that people become refugees is that their states are unable or unwilling to 
protect them. However, international human rights law, to its very essence, 
is about protecting the rights of all, without distinction. States remain 
allowed to differentiate between citizens and non-citizens, to some extent. 
Still, while the possibility to remove a suspected terrorists may seem 
reassuring in the eyes of the community, this is obviously only possible with 
regard to non-citizens. There is no possibility of removing a citizen of a 
state based on such suspicion. To the backdrop of the argument of global 
terrorism, the distinction between citizen and non-citizen is most likely 
irrelevant in the eyes of a community in fear of terrorism.  
 
Ultimately, while international human rights dictate that the right to non-
refoulement is absolute and non-derogable, the UNHCR and the practice of 
multiple states seriously undermines an argument that a balancing act 
between the interest of the refugee and the security concerns of a state is 
illegal. The fact that the exceptions to non-refoulement must be interpreted 
restrictively does not, in itself, mean that a balancing act is not permissible. 
On the contrary, it suggests that the principle of proportionality should be 
considered. While there at least seems to be consensus between human 
rights law and refugee law on the absolute prohibition on refoulement to 
face torture, cases such as Suresh indicates unwillingness from states to 
allow such a categorical prohibition.  Consequently, the application of non-
refoulement in the counter-terrorism context paints a picture of a collision 
between a legal provision and political interests.   
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